Sanhedrin Daf 34 סַנהֶדרִין דַף 34

The Mishnah on Daf 32a taught that in דיני נפשות, one who argued for the defendant’s conviction can later argue for acquittal, but one who argued for his acquittal cannot change to argue for conviction. Rav says that this only applies בשעת משא ומתן – during the time of [the judges’] deliberations; he must attempt to defend his original position to find him innocent. אבל בשעת גמר דין – But at the time of voting on the verdict, מלמד זכות חוזר ומלמד חובה – even one who argued for acquittal may revert and argue for conviction and vote according to his final opinion. Rav’s ruling is challenged by Rebbe Yose bar Chanina’s statement, that if one of the תלמידים who sat before the דיינים argued for acquittal and died, רואין אותו כאילו חי ועומד במקומו – we view him as if he is alive and maintaining his position and count his vote for acquittal. But according to Rav, perhaps this student would have changed his mind for conviction at the verdict!? The Gemara answers that he did not actually change his mind before dying, and we need not be concerned that he would have done so.

Rav’s ruling is challenged from a Mishnah which teaches that two scribes record each judge’s position and reason for arguing for conviction or acquittal. Recording a judge’s reason for conviction is understandable, because if he proposes a different reason for conviction the next day, we would require waiting overnight before ruling, since it is a new position. But why do we record the position and reason of a judge arguing for acquittal? Apparently, it is to prevent him from changing his mind to vote for conviction, which Rav holds he may do!? The Gemara answers that his reasoning is recorded, כדי שלא יאמרו שנים טעם אחד משני מקראות – so that two judges do not say one reason based on two different pesukim, because Rebbe Yochanan ruled about such a case: אין מונין להן אלא אחד – we only count them as one vote, because one of them must be mistaken. Abaye explains that the passuk, "אחת דבר אלקים שתים זו שמעתי" – one thing Hashem has spoken, but these two I have heard, teaches: מקרא אחד יוצא לכמה טעמים – one passuk can impart many teachings, ואין טעם אחד יוצא מכמה מקראות – but one teaching cannot be imparted from many pesukim.

The Mishnah on Daf 32a taught: דיני ממונות דנין ביום וגומרין בלילה – monetary cases are tried by day and may be concluded at night. This is derived from Rava’s resolution to an apparent contradiction in pesukim. One passuk says: ושפטו את העם בכל עת – they shall judge the people at any time, including night, and another says: והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו – and it shall be on the day that he bequeaths his son, etc., which implies judgements must take place by day!? Rava explained: יום לתחלת דין – Day is required for the beginning of the case, whereas לילה לגמר דין – night is allowed for the conclusion of the case.

This Mishnah disagrees with Rebbe Meir, who says there is a hekesh between ריבים – monetary disputes and נגעים – [tzaraas] afflictions, teaching: מה נגעים ביום – just as tzaraas must be examined by day, אף ריבים ביום – so too disputes are judged by day. He also disqualifies a blind judge from this hekesh.

דיני נפשות are tried and concluded only by day, based on the passuk: והוקע אותם לה' נגד השמש – and hang them before Hashem against the sun.